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COPING WITH TECHNOLOGY THROUGH
THE LEGAL PROCESS*
David L. Bazelont
If, as Socrates said, it is a wise man who knows what he does
not know, a discussion of "coping with technology through the
legal process" should allow me to display uncommon wisdombecause technology, and science, are things about which I frankly
know very little. I suggested recently that judges are, for the most
part, "technically illiterate,"' and I certainly include myself in that
category. But whatever our limitations, the judiciary is increasingly
being asked to grapple with scientific and technological issues of
great complexity. Some two-thirds of the D.C. Circuit's caseload
now involves review of action by federal administrative agencies;
and more and more of such cases relate to matters on the frontiers
of technology. What are the ecological effects of building a pipeline to bring oil across the Alaskan tundra?2 How can society manage radioactive wastes from nuclear reactors, which remain toxic
for two hundred centuries or more? 3 Shall we ban DDT, 4 or the
* An earlier version of this Article was presented as the Henry A. Carey Lecture on
Civil Liberties at Cornell Law School on November 29, 1976.
t Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
I wish to express my gratitude for the assistance of my law clerk, Douglas A. Dworkin,
in the preparation of this Article.
'Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 67 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (concurring opinion,
Bazelon, C.J.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
2 See Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 917 (1973).
3
See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Reg. Comm'n,
547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. granted sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977).
4See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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Concorde SST, 5 or lead in gasoline? 6 These and many more such
imponderables are now coming before our court, and the end is
nowhere in sight.
My judicial experience in dealing with these cases has not, of
course, given me any expertise in science or technology. It has,
however, stirred many thoughts, about zwhIo should be making
these decisions, about the procedures that should be followed in
making them, and, more generally, about how society can come to
terms with science and learn to cope with technological progress.
The idea that nonscientists can or should have anything to
do with science is a relatively recent one, and one that may not be
entirely welcome to the scientific community. Scientists have sometimes likened
their profession to an autonomous, self-governing
"republic."17 To qualify for citizenship in this republic, one's scientific credentials would have to be in order. And only its "citizens"
-that is, only scientists-would be entitled to a voice in the way
the scientific community is governed; only they could participate
in the process of mutual criticism that keeps science valid. As
Gerard Piel, the publisher of Scientific American, recently wrote, "A
scientist can accept no authority but his own judgment and conscience .... ,
For a good many years, the rest of us, the nonscientists, really
had no quibble with this view. Scientific and technological progress were seen as inevitable, and as inherently desirable. We were
happy to leave the scientists alone-at least as long as science-based
technology provided us with a never-ending stream of technological goodies.
Recently, however, we have begun to reexamine our relationship with the so-called "republic of science." Since World War II,
government, science, and technology have become increasingly
interdependent. The Manhattan Project, Sputnik, the Apollo program, and, most recently, the enactment of significant environmental legislation, are some of the familiar landmarks along this
road towards increasing interdependence. The reasons for this

3

See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Coleman, No. 76-1105 (D.C. Cir. May 19,
1976) (unreported).
'See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976).
See Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory, 1 MINERVA 54
(1962); Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209, 217-18 (1972).
8 Sinsheimer & Piel, Inquiring into Inquiry: Two Opposing View's, HASTINGS
REPORT, August 1976, at 19..
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new interdependence are also familiar. First, the costs of much
modern research and development are so enormous that only the
government has the resources to foot most of the bill; and when
government pays for research, some governmental supervision of
that research is inevitable.
More importantly, however, we are all becoming increasingly
conscious of the extent to which many supposedly scientific or
technical decisions involve painful value choices, and pose difficult
policy problems. We have come to realize that virtually every technological innovation may carry unwanted consequences, and that
technological progress may therefore cause, as well as solve, critical
societal problems. We have even begun to ask whether there are
certain subjects into which scientists should not inquire at all, because the process of investigation, or the knowledge to be acquired,
may bring too many perils along with its promises.
Scientists are not entirely happy to find themselves the target
of this scrutiny. When the National Science Foundation recently
asked the directors of America's leading research institutions for
their views on the current state of American science, one recurring
response was an objection to excessive regulation of scientific activities, and to bureaucratic "meddling" in their domain.' In the
words of one participant in the study, "The ever increasing bureaucracy... will in the not too distant future completely eradicate
1
our Nation's world position in research and technology." '(
These complaints are not frivolous. Regulation is costly.
Someone has to pay the salaries of the bureaucrats who are looking
over the scientists' shoulders, and of the judges who are looking
over the bureaucrats' shoulders. And, more importantly, of course,
this kind of surveillance can impede or even stifle needed research.
The problem, though, is that science and technology are not
now-if, indeed, they ever were-the exclusive domain of the scientists and engineers. While their expertise is essential for assessing
the costs and benefits of particular innovations, it provides no
special qualifications for determining how the balance between
costs and benefits should be struck.
How can such decisions be made? When we know that drugs
may cause disease as well as cure it, that powerful new pesticides
-'See NATIONAL

SCIENCE BOARD, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION,

SCIENCE AT THE Bi-

A REPORT FROM THE RESEARCH COMMUNITY 63-69 (1976).
IId. at 66 (response of Harold M. Agnew, Director of Los Alamos Scientific Labora-

CENTENNIAL:

tory).
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may pollute our water, that devastating accidents may occur at
nuclear power plants, and even that our use of spray deodorants
may someday cause an increased incidence of skin tumors, how
can we weigh the benefits against the risks? And when we know
that our resources are limited, how do we decide how those resources should be allocated-whether for basic or applied research,
for the treatment of kidney disease or cancer, for a mass immunization program against swine flu, for a major nutrition program, or for countless other worthy projects?
In primitive societies, painful choices of this sort are often
made by the tribal witch doctor. When powerful interests clash,
when the need to choose between cherished but conflicting values
threatens to disrupt the society, the simplest path is decision by a
shaman, or wizard, who claims special and miraculous insight. By
externalizing the decision to the gods, the tribe avoids dangerous
internal confrontations. Other ages have achieved the same escape
from conflict through their own soothsayers, savants, and oracles.
We, too, are not immune from the temptation to turn these decisions over to a shaman-although, instead of a mask and feathers,
we might prefer to dress our witch doctors in white lab coats or
black robes.
Questions of this sort pose -difficult-if not impossible-problems for decisionmakers. The experts are likely to disagree about
the underlying facts, which are usually both complex and uncertain; they are even more likely to disagree about the inferences to
be drawn from those facts. Postponing a decision may sometimes
provide the opportunity to reduce uncertainty. But a decision not
to decide, or to delay deciding, is still a decision." Both time and
information can be costly resources.
Consider, for example, the ongoing controversy about fluorocarbon propellants in aerosol cans. Several years ago some scientists announced that the use of these propellants was gradually
breaking down the ozone layer that surrounds the atmosphere
and protects the earth from harmful ultraviolet radiation. 1 2 The
result could be an increased incidence of skin cancer and possible
climatic changes. Other scientists, however, came forward to chalII See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
12 See
CARBONS:

RESEARCH

generally

NATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL

RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY

EFFECTS OF CHLOROFLUOROMETHANE RELEASE

COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, HALOCARBONS:

SPHERIC OZONE

(1976).

OF SCIENCES,

(1976);

HALO-

NATIONAL

EFFECTS ON STRATO-
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lenge these findings. Consequently, although there were proposals
to ban these propellants immediately, a decision on the matter
was postponed to allow the National Academy of Sciences to con3
duct further studies in an effort to lessen doubts.'
The Academy's study found that continued use of fluorocarbons would, indeed, pose significant hazards; 14 it proposed,
however, a two-year delay in the regulation of fluorocarbons, in
order to allow time for additional studies and a further reduction
of uncertainty.' 5 I certainly cannot say whether regulation of these
products should or should not have been delayed. 16 The Academy
evaluated the "penalties of delay," and concluded that they were
slight. 1 7 But whether the costs of delay in this case are great or
small, the important point is that we always pay a price for the
luxury of greater certainty. In the fluorocarbon case, for example,
delaying regulation means that at least a little more ozone will be
removed from the stratosphere; and equally importantly, money
will have been spent on additional fluorocarbon studies that could
have been spent for other purposes-say, to retrain workers in
fluorocarbon plants. Alternatively, we could use that money to
study the effects on the ozone layer of the nitrogen in fertilizers
which, according to recent studies, may have a far more substantial
impact than aerosol sprays.' 8
Even if all the scientific experts were in complete agreement
about the magnitude of the risks posed by fluorocarbons-a factual issue-a difficult value choice would still remain; we would still
have to choose betweeh present, well-documented economic dislocation on the one hand, and future, probabilistic harm to human
13See generally sources cited in note 12 supra.
14See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, HALOCARBONS:

ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF CHLOROFLUOROMETHANE RELEASE, supra note 12, at 1-3 to 1-6.
15 See id. at 1-8 to 1-9.
16 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), and the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), as well as several states,
began efforts to regulate flourocarbons shordy after the Academy's report was issued. See
F.D.A. Urges a Curb on Fluorocarbons, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1976, at 6, col. 1; Agency [EPA]
Plans Crackdown on Fluorocarbon Gases, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1976, at 26, col. 6: Fluorocarbon
Sprays Curb Backed [by CPSC], N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1976, at 21, col. 5; Michigan Votes to Ban
Some Aerosol Spra s, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1976, at 24, col. 1.
On May 13, 1977, the three agencies jointly published proposed regulations to ban
most manufacture and use of fluorocarbons. See 42 Fed. Reg. 24,535-50; see also id. at 24,255
(cosmetic ingredient labeling established by FDA for seven fluorocarbon propellants).
17 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, HALOCARBONS:
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF CHLOROFLUOROMETHANE RELEASE, supra note 12. at 1-7.

"SSee, e.g., Will Fertilizers Harm Ozone as Much as SST's?, 195 SCIENCE 658 (1977);
Johnson, The Fertilizer-Ozone Connection, 195 SCIENCE 1280 (1977) (letter to the editor).
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health on the other. Who should make that choice? The fluorocarbon manufacturers? The scientific community? Congress? The
Food and Drug Administration? And if the information about
nitrogen in fertilizers is correct, we might have to make a still more
painful choice. Removing those fertilizers from the market might
cause mass starvation around the world. How do we balance more
skin cancer against more starvation? And how do we compare a
certain and immediate reduction in agricultural production with
the possible future reduction that might accompany climatic
changes? How should such choices be made? And who should bear
their cost?
Amidst this swirling uncertainty, one thing seems ver , clear.
Courts are not the agency either to resolve the factual disputes, or
to make the painful value choices. The problem is not just that
these scientific issues are complicated; courts have long grappled
with complicated issues in reviewing actions by the FCC, SEC,
ICC, CAB, and scores of other governmental regulatory agencies.
These more traditional administrative matters, however, involve
issues with which all judges have at least a speaking familiarity; but
I daresay that almost none have the knowledge and training to
assess the merits of competing scientific arguments. And this is
hardly a task for on-the-job training.
It follows that, where administrative decisions on scientific
issues are concerned, it makes no sense to rely upon the courts to
evaluate the agency's scientific and technological determinations;
and there is perhaps even less reason for the courts to substitute
their own value preferences for those of the agency, to which the
legislature has presumably delegated the decisional power and
responsibility.' 9
'9 For several years my colleagues on the D.C. Circuit and I have engaged in a lively
debate, in opinions and articles, about the standards that should govern judicial review of
administrative action in scientific areas. See, for example, the five separate opinions in Ethyl
Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976), in which our
court upheld regulations issued by the EPA Administrator requiring annual reductions in
the lead content of leaded gasoline. Although I joined Judge Wright's opinion for the
court, I wrote separately (in an opinion joined by Judge McGowan) to reiterate my view that,
in cases of great technological complexity, the best way for courts to guard against
unreasonable or erroneous administrative decisions is not for the judges themselves to scrutinize the technical merits of each decision. Rather, it is to establish
a decision-making process that assures a reasoned decision that can be held up
to the scrutiny of the scientific community and the public.
541 F.2d at 66 (concurring opinion, Bazelon, C.J.), quoting International Harvester Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (opinion concurring in result, Bazelon,
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What courts and judges can do, however-and do well when
conscious of their role and limitations-is scrutinize and monitor
the decisionmaking process to make sure that it is thorough, complete, and rational; that all relevant information has been considered; and that insofar as possible, those who will be affected by
a decision have had an opportunity to participate in it. The
agencies themselves will usually be in the best position to determine
which particular procedures, or combinations of procedures, are
best suited to a particular issue. But whatever procedures are
used, the important thing is that the agency generate a record in
which the factual issues are fully developed.
By articulating both their factual determinations and their
value preferences, and by attempting to separate the one from the
other, administrators make possible effective professional peer review, as well as legislative and public oversight. With respect to
scientific, factual determinations, decisionmakers should disclose
where and why the experts disagree as well as where they concur,
and where the information is sketchy as well as complete. Other
experts who are steeped in the subject matter-in academe, in
government, in industry-can then evaluate the agency's factual
determinations, bring new data to light, or challenge gaps in reasoning. And if individuals or groups differ with the agency's value
choices, they can make their views known in the various public
forums. When the reasons for decisions are fully disclosed, there
C.J.). "Because substantive review of mathematical and scientific evidence by technically
illiterate judges is dangerously unreliable" (541 F.2d at 67), I have long urged that courts
concentrate their efforts on strengthening administrative procedures:
When administrators provide a framework for principled decision-making, the
result will be to diminish the importance of judicial review by enhancing the integrity of the administrative process, and to improve the quality of judicial review
in those cases where judicial review is sought.
Id., quoting Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (Bazelon, C.J.). See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States
Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 645-46 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, C.J.), id. at 655-57
(separate statement, Bazelon, C.J.), cert. granted sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977). But see Ethyl Corp.
v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34-36 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J.), id. at 68-69 (concurring statement, LeventhaI, J.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
United States Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 660-61 & n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (statement concurring in result, Tamm, J.), cert. granted sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977). See generally
Bazelon, The Impact of the Courts on Public Administration, 52 IND. L.J. 101 (1976); Leventhal, EnvironmentalDecisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509 (1974);
Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judiial Review, 59 CORNELL
L. REv. 375 (1974).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 62:817

is a genuine opportunity to seek reconsideration in light of new
knowledge or changing values.
Necessarily, action may have to be taken in the face of uncertainty, before all the information is available. But awareness of
our ignorance puts us ever on the lookout for better and more
certain information. And it gives reason to hope that erroneous
decisions will not be set in concrete.
I have long urged that even society's most technical decisions
must be ventilated in a public forum with public input and participation. Recently, there have been encouraging indications that
others may have come to the same conclusion. For example,
former Secretary of Transportation William Coleman made his decision to permit Concorde SST landings in New York and Washington only after an elaborate series of hearings, with wide-ranging public participation; and he accompanied his decision with a
lengthy document, setting forth in detail the reasons for the decision, and the evidence on which it was based. 3 The Secretary's
statement does not attempt to make the decision look easier than
it actually was-it points out where the evidence was shaky, and
acknowledges the hard value choices made. In devising the procedures by which he reached this decision, the Secretary displayed a
sensitivity to the values of open decisionmaking and a willingness
perhaps to go beyond the bare minimum required by the National
Environmental Policy Act 21 and the Administrative Procedure
Act. 22 As he said, "A decision that 'cannot be explained' is very
likely to be an arbitrary decision. ' 23 Similarly, the decision of Dr.
Donald Fredrickson, the Director of the National Institutes of
Health, to issue guidelines for research involving recombinant
DNA followed two years of intensive discussion, consultation, and
hearings, with substantial public participation; 2 4 and the guidelines
were accompanied by an Environmental Impact Statement, which
20Se

U.S.

DEP'T

OF TRANSPORTATION,

THE SECRETARY'S

DECISION ON

CONCORDE

SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT (1976). See also the statement of William T. Coleman, Jr., Secretary of Transportation, before the Subcommittee on Government Activities and Transportation, House Committee on Government Operations, on the Concorde SST, Friday,
Dec. 12, 1975.

2142 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
22 5 U.S.C.

§§

551-559 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).

23 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION,

THE SECRETARY'S DECISION ON CONCORDE SUPER-

SONIC TRANSPORT, supra note 20, at 7.
214
See Decision of the Director, National Institutes of Health, to Release Guidelines

for Research on Recombinant DNA Molecules, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902, 27,903 (1976). The
guidelines themselves are reported at 41 Fed. Reg. 27,911 (1976).
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assessed their pros and cons, and weighed them against possible
alternatives.2 5
These issues are highly controversial, and many will disagree
with the decisions that were actually reached. But by articulating
those decisions clearly, these officials have helped to make intelligent public debate possible. For example, Secretary Coleman
acknowledged the possibility that even limited Concorde flights
might produce a slight increase in the number of nonfatal cases of
skin cancer every year, but he concluded that the benefits of the
flights were worth that risk. 26 This is the kind of painful trade-off
that decisionmakers are sometimes tempted to cover up. But these
trade-offs are being made in the public's name, and the publicthe "ultimate guinea pig"-has a right, and a duty, to know about
them. As Justice Frankfurter once said, in a passage quoted by
Secretary Coleman, "the processes of government are essentially
educational. 2 7 To serve this educational function, government
must fully inform the public about what's being done, and why.
We can never be sure that open decisionmaking will actually
produce better decisions; in the long run, however, I believe that it
will. Even though openness by itself cannot help a decisionmaker
resolve uncertainties, it is the best technique we have for making
sure that he is both aware of those uncertainties, and has actually
addressed them.
This kind of openness is in everyone's best interests, inchding
the decisionmakers'-and the examples I have cited lead me to hope
that there may be a growing awareness of this fact. When the issues
are controversial, any decision may fail to satisfy large portions
of the community. But those who are dissatisfied with a particular
decision will be more likely to acquiesce in it if they perceive that
their views and interests were given a fair hearing. If the decisionmaker has frankly laid the competing considerations on the table,
so that the public knows the worst as well as the best, he is unlikely
to find himself accused of high-handedness, deceit, or cover-up.
We simply cannot afford to deal with these vital issues in a manner
that invites public cynicism and distrust.
2'See NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT:
GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING RECOMBINANT DNA MOLECULES (Aug. 19, 1976).
16 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, THE SECRETARY'S DECISION ON CONCORDE SUPERSONIC
relied
corde
to the

27

TRANSPORT, supra note 20, at 57-58. The calculations upon which the Secretary
indicated that "over a 30 year period of continuous operations, the proposed Conflights could add an average of around 200 new cases of nonmelanomic skin cancer
approximately 250,000 already experienced per year in the United States." Id. at 37.

Statement of William T. Coleman, Jr., supra note 20, at 6.
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As I have suggested, Secretary Coleman and Dr. Fredrickson
displayed considerable creativity in devising procedures to deal
with the Concorde and DNA decisions. The question is whether
we should rely on the creativity of individual, enlightened administrators-or whether, instead, we should consider some sort of
wide-ranging institutional reform, to improve the way we make
our critical scientific and technological choices. The problem, of
course, is that any kind of across-the-board solution might deprive
decisionmakers of the flexibility to experiment with different
kinds of procedures for different kinds of issues.
A number of reforms have been suggested, with the goal of
making our factual decisions more accurate and objective, and our
value choices more fair. Probably the most widely publicized suggestion has been that we create a "Science Court," to resolve technical, factual disputes. 28 As I understand it, this "court"-which
might be a permanent institution, or simply an ad hoc board of
inquiry-would consist of a panel of scientist/judges, who would
attempt to resolve factual disputes argued before them by expert
proponents of the opposing scientific positions. 29 The Court would
not itself make any policy decisions or value choices; instead, it
would present its findings on "the current state of technical knowledge" to the responsible political agency, which would then make
3
the ultimate decisions. 11
In the words of its proponents, the goal of the Science Court
31
is to reduce "the extension of authority beyond competence,"
and that is a goal I wholeheartedly support. Scientists are uniquely

28 Dr. Arthur Kantrowitz, Chairman of the Avco Everett Research Laboratory, Inc.,
has actively advocated the creation of such a court for more than a decade. See, for example, Dr. Kantrowitz's statement delivered March 16, 1967, before the Subcommittee on
Government Research, Senate Committee on Government Operations, reprinted in 113
CONG. REC. 15,256 (1967); Kantrowitz, Controlling Technology Democratically, 63 AM. SciENTIST 505 (1975).

The Science Court concept has attracted considerable support, especially in recent
years. At a Science Court colloquium held in September 1976, sponsored by the Commerce
Department, the National Science Foundation, and the American Association for the Advancement of Science, a proposed "experiment" to test the efficacy of a Science Court was
endorsed by, among others, the Secretary of Commerce, the Science Adviser to the President, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. See Science Court:
High Officials Back Test of ControversialConcept, 194 SCIENCE 167 (1976).
29 See Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in
Science and Technology, The.Science Court Experiment: An Interim Report, 193 SCIENCE 653,
653 (1976).
" ld.
31
Id.
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32
competent to address scientific/factual issues-science is elitist.

But, as I have already suggested, their special competence does
not extend to value choices; with respect to those choices, the opinions of scientists are entitled to no greater weight than those of
the rest of us.
While 1 thus support the goals of the Science Court proposal,
I find some of its features troubling. First, I fear that a lengthy
adversary proceeding, limited solely to factual issues, might well
exaggerate the importance of those issues, and might tend to diminish the importance of the underlying value choices. A factual
decision by a Science Court, surrounded by all the mystique of
both science and the law, might well have enormous, and unwarranted, political impact.
Moreover, it is not entirely clear to me that all disputes among
experts either could or should be "resolved." Experts usually disagree not so much about the objectively verifiable facts, but about
the inferences that can be drawn from those facts. And they disagree precisely because it is impossible to say with certainty which
of those inferences are "correct."
Consider, for example, the discussion of the possibility of
catastrophic accidents at nuclear reactors. Most experts agree that
the likelihood of such an accident is pretty low, but they disagree
about just how low. And there is no experiment we can conduct to
determine which experts are right-it is just not practical to construct 1,000 reactors and monitor them for 10,000 years, to determine how safe reactors really are. Physicist Alvin Weinberg has
called such questions "trans-scientific"; 3 3 and while it is appropriate
for scientists to address these questions-they do involve facts
rather than values-the scientific method simply cannot provide
definitive answers. A Science Court might choose not to address
such issues at all; 34 in that case, its usefulness would be limited to
a fairly small category of controversial scientific issues. If it did try
to resolve such essentially unresolvable issues, however, it is hard
32 Dr. Philip Handler, President of the National Academy of Sciences, recently noted

that the Academy is an inherently "elitist organization" whose only "special asset" is the technical expertise of its members. See Handler Defends Academy Elitism, 191 SCIENCE 543 (1976).
See generally Handler, A Rebuttal: The Need for a Sufficient Scientific Base for Government Regulation, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 808 (1975).
'3 Weinberg, supra note 7, at 219.
" The "Interim Report" of the presidential task force on the Science Court seems to
suggest that the Court will avoid questions of this sort. See Task Force of the Presidential
Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in Science and Technology, The Science Court Experiment: An Interim Report, supra note 29, at 654.
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to see how it could do much more than affix a "seal of approval"
to a majority or "establishment" point of view-and that might
simply discourage dissent.
Finally, I fear that the kind of adjudicatory procedures contemplated by the Science Court idea might prove to be very timeconsuming. Of course, no one is fonder of adjudicatory procedures than judges-but we are acutely conscious of just how costly
35
they can be.
Having expressed all these misgivings, I must reiterate that
I fully support the goals of the Science Court idea; and I think that
Dr. Arthur Kantrowitz and the other backers of the proposal have
performed a great public service, simply by forcing us all to think
and talk about these issues.
On the other hand, I object strongly to some of the other
proposals that have been advanced, ostensibly to improve the way
courts handle technical/factual disputes. It has been suggested that
instead of creating scientist/judges and Science Courts, perhaps we
should merely try to upgrade the courts and the judges that we already have. We could, for example, attempt some sort of systematic
instruction of the judiciary in the ways of science; or we could appoint expert science advisers, to sit at the right hand of a judge
when he is considering a case with scientific overtones. 36 Both of
these proposals strike me as very harmful. When science has become so complex and specialized that even scientists in one field
have difficulty understanding their colleagues in related specialties, we can hardly hope to succeed in raising the judiciary's scientific consciousness. The most likely result of such a program
would simply be to encourage judges to wade in, where previously
they would have feared to tread. The science adviser idea suffers
from the same flaw; and it also runs the risk of creating surrogate
judges, who would be making all the real decisions, while we judges
are simply left to wear the black robes. In highly controversial
areas, where the experts disagree, it would be dangerous indeed to
allow one expert with one point of view to have special access to the
judge's ear.
Improving the way we make our value choices may prove
even more difficult than improving the way we resolve factual dis15 Administrative agencies are similarly aware of how costly and time-consuming adjudicative procedures can be. In one celebrated case, it took the FDA nine years to determine just how many peanuts there should be in peanut butter. See W. GELLHORN & C.
BYsE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 733-34 (6th ed. 1974).

36 See, e.g., Leventhal, supra note 19, at 546-54.
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putes. I have long advocated broadened public participation in the
administrative process as a technique for ensuring that, insofar as
possible, the decisions that are made reflect the divergent interests
in our society. But as Professor Richard Stewart has recently
pointed out, "interest representation" is no panacea.3 7 Various
proposals have been made to broaden representation in agency
38
proceedings, by, for example, funding public interest intervenors.
I fully support the goal of these proposals, and I think that they
are worth a try. But we have to remember that any scheme of this
sort raises extraordinarily difficult problems. Who should be represented? Who is entitled to speak for the public interest, and
who is entitled to public funds to do so? How do we guard against
subsidizing the most vocal representatives of the public interest,
instead of the most worthy? And how do we assess the risk that increasing the number of participants in a particular proceeding may
simply prolong the decisionmaking process, without necessarily
improving, or even changing, the eventual result?
These are valid concerns. But I am not sure that we have
much choice. In democratic societies, elected legislatures traditionally make the hard value choices. Indeed, this is precisely what
legislatures are designed to do. Increasingly, however, our legislatures have delegated these value choices to administrative agencies
that cannot resolve value conflicts through the
-institutions
relatively simple expedient of a show of hands. I believe that if we
are going to ask unelected administrators to make our vital "legislative policy judgments,' 3 9 some sort of "interest representation"
is an absolutely essential safeguard.
An alternative, of course, would be to give these decisions
back to the legislators. While this has some appeal in theory, I fear
that it is not very practical to expect a relative handful of legislators
somehow to keep tabs on all the wide-ranging and complex activities in which the government is involved today. For a good
many years the courts tried, through the "non-delegation doctrine," to impose some limitations on legislative delegations of responsibility. That doctrine has now been largely abandoned, be-

'7See

Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1667,
1686 (1975).
38 See, e.g., Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participationin the
Administrative Process, 60 GEo. L.J. 525 (1972); Gellhorn, Public Participationin Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359 (1972); Note, FederalAgency Assistance to Impecunions Intervenors, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1815 (1975).
39
See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 26 (D. C. Cir.) (en banc) (Wright, J.), id. at 66
(concurring opinion, Bazelon, C.J.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
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cause it simply didn't work, and I see little likelihood that it will be
revived.
Of course, legislatures can become more involved in scientific
and technological disputes whenever they wish to do so. For example, largely as a result of the issuance by the National Institutes
of Health of guidelines on recombinant DNA research," that
issue is now being debated in the halls of various state and local
legislatures. 4 1 At its best, the involvement of local legislatures can
ensure that local interests are adequately considered when national
policies are being formulated. The other side of the coin, of course,
is that such involvement may become a device whereby important
national policies are deflected by parochial concerns.
Still another alternative is to go one step further and let the
voters themselves resolve these value conflicts, by means of referenda. The nuclear power controversy has recently caused a resurgence of interest in this approach. On election day last year, six
states conducted initiatives sponsored by opponents of the'expansion of nuclear power; California conducted a similar initiative last
June. 4 2 The pro-nuclear forces frequently lament the state of public ignorance about this subject, and express concern that the public will be swept away by anti-nuclear hysteria. 4 3 Interestingly,
however, all seven of the anti-nuclear initiatives were defeated at
44
the polls, by overwhelming margins.
A number of reasons have been advanced to explain these
defeats, including the disproportion in campaign funds available
4o See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
41 The most prominent example has been the Cambridge, Massachusetts City Council,
which debated the issue for some eight months, and only recently rejected a proposal by the
mayor of Cambridge to ban such research altogether within the Cambridge city limits-i.e.,
at Harvard and MIT. Although the Council voted to allow the research to go forward, it
required that the research be conducted under safeguards slightly more strict than those
contained in the NIH guidelines. See Gene-Splicing: Cambridge Citizens OK Research but Want
More Safety, 195 SCIENCE 268 (1977); DNA: Laws, Patents, and a Proselyte, 195 SCIENCE 762
(1977).
The enactment of federal legislation regulating recombinant DNA research has also
been suggested, to supplement the voluntary NIH guidelines. See Califano, Rejecting Ban,
Backs Curbs on Genetic Study, Washington Post, Mar. 17, 1977, at A14; Gene Splicing: Congress Starts FramingLaw for Research, 196 SCIENCE 39 (1977).
42
See Nuclear Initiatives: Two Sides Disagree on Meaning of Defeat, 194 SCIEN cE 811, 811
(1976).
" See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Reg. Comm'n,
547 F.2d 633, 655 & n.62 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, C.J.), cert. granted sub nom. Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 1098
(1977).
14 See Nuclear Initiatives: Two Sides Disagree on Meaning of Defeat, supra note 42, at 811.
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to the pro- and anti-nuclear factions. 45 But I suspect that one reason these initiatives failed was that their sponsors were guilty of
the same sin of which they had often accused government and industry leaders-namely, they failed to level with the people. All
these initiatives presented the voters with only one side of the equation-they asked the voters to cut back on nuclear power, but they
did not make clear what the consequences of a cut-back would be.
In Colorado, the Straight Creek Journal-akind of counter-culture
newspaper-came out against the initiative, because, it said, the
initiative's sponsors had failed to address the "existential dilemma"
of the energy crisis-that is, they had failed to compare the costs
and hazards of nuclear power with those associated with alterna46
tive energy sources.
Unfortunately, much of the above discussion will also not be
very helpful in dealing with that "existential dilemma." The decisionmaking mechanisms I have described are admirably suited to
dealing with relatively narrow, discrete issues-the "cases" and
"controversies" of which judges are so fond. Btit neither the courts,
nor the agencies, are equipped to do what the energy crisis demands-namely, develop broad national policies, and articulate
national goals. And without a national energy policy to chart the
course, there is really no way to measure the wisdom or fairness of
various individual decisions affecting the energy problem.
The energy crisis is obviously not the only problem that calls
for the articulation of national goals; but it does provide an especially stark example. Our society-and perhaps all of civilizationrests on the ready availability of cheap oil. But it now appears that
at some point in the foreseeable future, that pillar is going to be
knocked out from under us. During the next thirty to fifty years,
we will almost certainly be forced to phase out our present reliance
on gas and oil and turn instead to alternate sources of energy, such
47
as coal, solar energy, fusion, and nuclear breeder reactors.
That transition will produce vast changes in our way of life,
and may well be accompanied by serious economic and social dislocation. Some believe it could strain our democratic institutions
to the breaking point, or even produce an international holocaust.
But it is a transition that we simply cannot avoid, and probably
45Id.
46
47
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cannot even postpone for very long. The best that we can hope for
is to make the transition without chaos and with as little disruption
as possible.
In order to do that, somebody will have to make the hard
choices about what level of energy consumption we should maintain, and which fuels, or combinations of fuels, we should rely
upon. And equally importantly, somebody will have to undertake
the massive, concerted effort necessary to convince a skeptical
public of what's ahead, what needs to be done, and what painful
48
choices simply have to be made.
Under our system that "somebody" must, of course, be our
political leadership. Courts see only the cases that are brought before them and must therefore focus their attention on the rights
and wrongs of those particular cases. They simply cannot engage
in the kind of balancing act that is required to set priorities and
allocate national resources. And administrative agencies, with
their narrowly-defined jurisdictions, are no better able to provide
the kind of broad perspective these decisions require.
There are, of course, enormous political barriers to dealing
forthrightly with the energy crisis-or with any of the other problems discussed above. Whether the issue is our energy policy for
the next fifty years, or the safety of a single pesticide, open decisionmaking procedures may be both inefficient, and embarrassing
for those involved. Legislators who ask their constituents to make
major sacrifices may end up sacrificing their own careers. The
pressures to decide in secret, or to cover up the real grounds for
decision, may be very great indeed. But even though those pressures may sometimes arise from understandable motives, it is vital
in a democracy that they be resisted at all costs. Otherwise, no matter how wise and judicious the decisions reached may be, they will
never be truly accepted by those who will be affected by them. As
the great philosopher John Stuart Mill wrote,
[E]ven if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole
truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and
earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be
held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or
feeling of its rational grounds. 49
" The remarks in the text were written prior to President Carter's announcement of
his proposed energy program. The announcement and accompanying material are set forth
in 13 WEEKLY COMP. oF Pm.S. Doe. 560-65, 566-83, 588-93 (Apr. 25, 1977). While I do
not wish to express any views on the merits of specific components of the President's program, I believe that his clear enunciation of the need for a "comprehensive national energy
policy" (id. at 566) is a vitally important step in the right direction.
49
J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 95 (London 1859).

